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Abstract 
 
This article analysesthe development and use of the concept“job quality” in the European 
Union’s(EU) employment policy.Using a set of four complementary public policy theories, 
it presents an analysisofhow both political and conceptual factors contributed to failing to 
achieve any significant progress in articulating job quality in the EU’s policy objectives and 
guidelines. Conceptual clarity in defining what job quality is (and what it is not), from 
whose perspective it should be considered,and which direction of change indicates 
improvement, are vital pre-requisites for an effective integration of job quality intothe 
EU’s employment strategy and into the elaboration of any successful social indicator. A 
constant political struggle between different actors at the EU level, and a need to 
reconcile the often-contradictory views of the social partners, precluded a completion of 
this first step. Instead, attempts to include job quality into the policy formulation process 
were made without simultaneously adapting the overall narrative, which continued to 
give prominence to flexibility and de-regulation. The outcome has been a rather cursory 
and inconsistent effort to implement policies and actions aimed at boosting job quality. 
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Job quality in the European employment policy: one step 
forward, two steps back? 
 
 
 
Introduction   
Ever since the Lisbon Strategy raised the profile of employment policy within the 
European Union (EU) by explicitly stating that its aim is to sustain “economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”(European Council, 2000), the 
expression ‘more and better jobs’ has become more of a rhetorical catchphrase of 
European employment and social policy rather than a policy of substance. In practice, 
both EU institutions and individual governments have prioritised the quantity of jobs – as 
measured by the rate of unemployment, or the rate of participation in the labour market 
– above the quality of jobs(Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernández-Macías, Antón, et al., 2011; 
Raveaud, 2007). Despite institutional and academic efforts, the quality of jobs remains a 
contested concept, which has not sufficiently penetrated policymaking at the EU level. 
Studies on this issue mainly focus on the role of ideas and actors in the process of policy 
development (Burchell et al., 2014), as well as on the balance between economic and 
social goals shaped by institutional and political developments (Souto-Otero, 2017; 
Streeck, 1995). We seek to deepen knowledge in this area by expanding the existing 
discussion towardsthe role and impact of statistical indicators of job quality in the EU 
employment policy. In short, we argue that indicators play a key role in the 
conceptualization and measurement of policy problems, which tend to be ignored if they 
are not measured. Moreover, they represent a necessary element of the EU’s governance 
mode in the area of employment that relies on goals, benchmarks and targets, none of 
which can be monitored, evaluated or sanctioned without appropriate indicators. 
Theoretically, we propose an analytical framework that integrates agenda-setting and 
public policy research (Béland, 2016; Kingdon, 1995), with an EU-focused analysis of social 
policy formulation (de la Porte and Pochet, 2012; Streeck, 1995).  
The contribution of this paper lies in examining reasons for the lack of effective progress 
observed thus far in the development of job quality indicators capable of guiding 
European social and employment policies. We first review institutional perspectives of job 
quality in the context of the current policy debate within the EU with the objective of 
explaining why the issue remains on the political backburner. In this context, we consider 
how job quality has been framed as a social policy problem in the evolving EU 
employment strategy, and how its measurement has been defined and redefined. We 
then address the question to what extent proposed definitions and indicators of job 
3 
 
quality have been driving policy making at the EU level. To what extent has job quality 
been included in EU governance and what impact has it had so far? To this aim, we 
undertake an extensive document analysis of EU publications and policy debates, 
focussing particularly on the role of the European Commission, central to driving EU policy 
in this area. We conclude by identifying the principal political and methodological 
shortcomings that have hindered progress on job quality within the EU’s employment 
policy. 
Overall, we show how a complex concept such as job quality has been defined and 
operationalised in the EU’s policy making process. The policy impact of any job quality 
indicator depends not only on the methodological quality and data availability, but also on 
the power relations between the actors involved. Job quality remains highly contested 
and contentious as it is viewed differently depending on whose perspective it is evaluated 
from. In particular, we point to constant contradictory pressures from different sides of 
the social partners’ negotiation table, as well as to the tension between the social and 
economic surveillance within EU institutions. The flexicurity narrative, which has re-
entered the EU’s employment policy, and which merges seemingly incompatible calls for 
better quality of work with labour market deregulation, is used to illustrate this point. We 
conclude by arguing that conceptual clarity and practical operationalization are vital pre-
requisites for including job quality in any employment strategy that the EU may put 
forward in the future. 
 
Articulating and measuringjob quality in the EU employment policy 
We argue, in this paper, that our core question as to why progress towards better jobs in 
Europe has been so slow and so unpredictable, can be at least partially understood from a 
consideration of theories of public policy. Many institutions and actors may have started 
their involvement in this process with a simple rational-choice approach, believing that 
the path to better jobs could be achieved by careful measurement and careful conceptual 
analysis of the roles of the various levers to be employed – regulation, trade unions, EU 
institutions, and so on. This first theory of rationalism in public policy making might have 
worked with other less political and less divisive policy objectives, but cannot explain the 
route so far to define job quality, and will probably be an even worse description of the 
way ahead. We are not advocating replacing this approach with one grand theory, but 
perhaps several theories can each explain a part of the process. 
For instance, a second useful public policy theoretical framework posits that many public 
and social policy processes are better described as a process of “incrementalism”, also 
referred to as “punctuated equilibriums”. The reasons for cycles of change and 
retrenchment can be varied as some policy priorities suddenly override others. In the case 
of job quality, for instance, it could be argued that slow progress is often undermined by 
economic crises in the EU, such as the credit crunch crisis, the Euro crisis, and more 
recently Brexit – in each case, the urgent trumping the important.  
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Athird useful theoretical contribution in the study of public policy is known as “group 
models” or “subsystems theory”. According to these theories, we should not be looking 
for simple, unfragmented paths but rather recognise the ability of think-tanks, political 
groupings, pressure groups, researchers and scholars to set agendas and change policy 
(Heclo, 1977). As the number of actors increases, so too does the complexity of the 
possibilities for informal and dynamic alliances.Kingdon(1995) goes beyond this and 
suggests that given the number of different ways to define problems and the nature of 
competition between politicians jockeying for advantage, along with the vagaries of the 
policy process, the sheer number of possible directions of travel yield a process that can 
be more accurately described as “organised anarchy” (referred to elsewhere as the 
“garbage can model”). 
In this process of policy development, many aspects interact with one another in complex, 
non-linear ways. Policy problems are identified by actors and ideas take the form of 
contested problem definitions. Actors then formulate potential policy alternatives to 
address these problems, which are not always coherent. Finally, concrete policy decisions 
are framed and brokered ina process which is shaped by the balance of power between 
actors.This article will illustrate just how well this theory fits with the concept of job 
quality and its ongoing redefinition.  
Finally, other theories such as the Open Method of Coordination (de la Porte and Pochet, 
2012), two tier social policy (Streeck, 1995), and other studies of EU social policy 
(Copeland and Daly, 2018) indicate that the presence of agreed and concise indicators 
isnecessary for raising the profile of social issues and increasing the likelihood of any 
corrective action, just asin the macro-economic public policy sphere. So any employment 
strategy needs to be underpinnedby indicators, if rhetoric and discourse are to be turned 
into actions. In this article, we reviewthe extent to which this was the case since the 
Lisbon strategy until the Pillar, considering that statistical indicators are a powerful aspect 
of problem definition and monitoring, which have a significant impact on policy debates. If 
indicators, however, are ambiguous, policy responses also end up being framed in 
ambiguous way, open to interpretation and discussion by various actors.  
As this article argues, the development of job quality indicators and the 
conceptualarticulation of job quality in the EU employment policy are thus closely 
interlinked. Since the launch of the Lisbon strategy, efforts to put job quality high on the 
policy agenda stimulated efforts to come up with a suitable methodology for its 
measurement. Progress in the area of measurement, in turn, provided policy makers with 
working definitions of job quality, allowing for the formulation of more specific policy 
recommendations in this area.  
Applying these lenses of public policy theory to the EU’s process of attempting to improve 
job quality provides a good way of understanding what has happened in the past, as well 
as a more realistic understanding of what to expect in the future. In the following section, 
we therefore review some of the milestones in the articulation and measurement of job 
quality in the EU employment policy, considering to what extent these processes have 
been successful and what impediments were encountered. 
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Post-Lisbon ‘more and better jobs’ agenda 
The promotion of good working conditions and provision of social security have long been 
core elements of the European social model and a basis of democratic welfare states. In 
fact, implicitly, the quality of jobs has always been an integral part of EU policy. Already 
the Treaty of Rome, the founding treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
signed in 1957, articulated the specific objective of improving the living and working 
conditions of its citizens.  
However, employment policy was historically left to individual Member States. It was not 
until 1997 that the first European Employment Strategy (EES) was launched with the aim 
of improving labour market outcomes by coordinating employment policy between 
member states(see Van Rie and Marx, 2012).The quality of work was shortly after 
institutionalised as one of the EU’s central policy objectives in the Lisbon Treaty of 2000, 
with the goal of achieving “sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs”(European Commission, 2001). Despite the conceptual weakness of the job quality 
dimension in the Lisbon strategy, the European Council meeting in Laeken in 2001 agreed 
on a portfolio of indicators to monitor the progress towards the principles of the 
employment policy agenda set in Lisbon(European Parliament, 2009).  
TheLaeken indicators were presented at the time as a political breakthrough (European 
Commission, 2001) and they certainly helped to introduce a multidimensional concept of 
job quality into the EU policy discourse. However, due to multiple and well-documented 
weaknesses (see e.g. Bothfeld and Leschke, 2012; Davoine et al., 2008; Dieckhoff and 
Gallie, 2007; Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernández-Macías, Esteve, et al., 2011; Peña-Casas, 2009; 
Piasna et al., 2017)this impact was limited and short-lived. The Laeken indicators were not 
suitable for setting goals, benchmarks or targets, nor assessing the implementation and 
impact of the policy recommendations in the area of job quality. In short, they were not 
suitable for the governance mode of the EU employment policy and failed to produce an 
open method of coordination that requires appropriate social indicators (de la Porte and 
Pochet, 2010). 
Subsequent initiatives seeking to improve the Laeken proposal (e.g. European 
Commission, 2008)replicated many of the initial weaknesses, resulting in a disorganized 
aggregation of variables describing jobs, individual attitudes, policies, participation rates 
and various forms of distributional inequalities. Furthermore, the question of quality for 
whom? remained unresolved. Actors involved in the job quality debate within the EU 
employment policy represented divergent views on what constitutes desired aspects of 
jobs, with wages and non-standard contracts among the most contentious issues. 
In parallel to the Laeken indicators, major stakeholders closely linked to the EU, including 
UNECE, ILO, Eurostat and Eurofound, joined forces to elaborate a broader, 
multidimensional conceptual framework for the comparative measurement of the quality 
of employment, bringing together elements of the ILO’s decent work and of the EU’s 
quality of work concepts (UNECE/ILO/Eurostat, 2007). The process leading to a publication 
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of a statistical framework for measuring the quality of employment took 15 years (UNECE, 
2015), demonstrating difficulty of a compromise between institutional actors and policy 
agendas. However, thisstatistical framework represented a complex statistical toolbox, 
and not a monitoring tool linked to any particular policy. It provided measurements on a 
very broad range of job, employment or social protection features, without any value 
judgments about what is considered “high quality” or “low quality” employment. Such a 
toolbox character precluded any international policy leverage, with countries free to pick 
and choose items that they find relevant or coinciding with current national political 
agenda. 
 
Post-2008 stagnationin articulating job quality at the policy level 
The process of limited progress was then punctuated by the economic downturn of the 
late-2000s(reference from above);a period characterised by budgetary austerity and 
deregulatory reforms. The EU policy focus shifted towards ‘flexicurity’ (European 
Commission, 2007), and the Europe 2020 strategy from 2010 (the successor of the Lisbon 
Strategy) expressed only a marginal focus on job quality. ‘Social devaluation’ (Degryse and 
Pochet, 2018) was taken as a route to restoring job growth and competitiveness of 
European economy.  
The renewed commitment of the EU Commission to flexicurity policy took a form of an 
encompassing strategy for balancing the expectations of economic growth, full 
employment and social cohesion. At the EU level, flexicurity evolved from the emphasis on 
skill development and employability substituting for job security (European Commission, 
2007), to the prominence given to flexibilisation and de-regulation of the employment 
relationship (European Commission, 2010a). Any proposal or recommendationfrom that 
period aimed at improving the situation of the EU labour market, came with a caveat that 
it should not limit in any way a necessary flexibility for employers, nor create barriers for 
business (European Commission, 2017d).  
Such policies, through redefining the basic power relations between employers and 
workers, as well asthe transfer of risks and responsibilities from employers to the 
workforce,created a favourable climate for employers’ representatives firmly to resist any 
regulation encroaching on their need for a flexible and highly adaptable workforce.This 
can be seen in the Employment Guidelines from that period, discussed below. 
After a period of stagnation, arenewed and much-anticipated attempt to produce 
statistical indicators relevant to the problem definition and monitoring of job quality (de la 
Porte and Pochet, 2012) was made by the EU’s Employment Committee (EMCO), the main 
advisory body on employment in the European Employment Strategy (EES) framework and 
responsible for drafting the Employment Guidelines. In 2013, one of its two bodies, the 
Indicators Group announced a multidimensional and comprehensive framework 
measuring job quality on four dimensions, subdivided into ten further sub-dimensions 
with 55 indicators(European Commission, 2014). Arguably, EMCO was advised by 
independent academic efforts, largely emerging at that time with the support of the 
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information provided by large-scale surveys, such as the European Working Conditions 
Survey (EWCS), the European Social Survey and the European Labour Force Survey. 
Prominent examples include the job quality index developed by Green and Mostafa for 
Eurofound(Green and Mostafa, 2012), the European Job Quality Index developed by ETUI 
researchers(Leschke et al., 2008; Piasna, 2017), as well as other specifications largely 
based on the EWCS data(e.g. Holman, 2013; Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernández-Macías, Antón, 
et al., 2011). 
However, some of the weaknesses of the EMCO proposal were manifest and cast doubts 
on whether it could have had any discernible policy impact. First, several indicators 
referred to the population at large (e.g. early leavers from education), people not in 
employment altogether (e.g. inactivity due to family responsibilities) or social services 
(e.g. childcare coverage). Furthermore, features of jobs (e.g. temporary employment) 
were confused with labour market dynamics and segmentation (e.g. labour transitions 
from temporary to permanent employment), as well as with worker characteristics (e.g. 
educational attainment or computer skills). Finally, the EMCO proposal relied on multiple 
data sources, many of them with infrequent and non-coinciding data gathering 
procedures, such as the five-yearly European Working Conditions Survey, or 4-yearly 
Structure of Earnings Survey. This renders the updating of the index rather problematic 
and too infrequent to be useful in the annual cycle of EU economic and social governance. 
Overall, EMCO’s proposal shifted from assessing working conditions of a particular job to 
the flexibility of the labour market, the quality of labour supply or the social infrastructure 
that enables workers with caring responsibilities to participate inthe labour market. The 
complexity and confusion precluded formulation of any clear policy recommendations and 
impact assessment, because heterogenous levels of analysis require different policy 
responses. For instance, the inclusion of worker characteristics in the job quality policy 
framework is likely to produce supply-side focused policies that do not address the 
demand side of the labour market. When educational attainment or skill levels are 
included in the job quality framework, the policy responses will include upskilling or 
lifelong learning. Although the importance of such policies cannot be questioned, they do 
fail to address the lack of good quality jobs. 
We find an illustration of the weaknesses created by the complexity of measurement and 
a lack of clarity about the subject of analysis in the Employment and Social Developments 
in Europe (ESDE) report (European Commission, 2014). Although it explored the 
developments of various job quality indicators along the dimensions proposed by EMCO, 
its policy conclusions did not follow from this analysis. For instance, there was a confusion 
in the ESDE as to whether increasing work intensity, one of the dimensions of job quality, 
is to be deplored as a negative development for workers’ well-being or applauded as 
means for achieving higher productivity (European Commission, 2014: 145–146). In 
asimilar vein, the analysis of job security was carried out predominantly from the 
employers’, not workers’, perspective. Some level of job security was expected to have a 
positive impact on workers’ commitment, but too much of it would risk inducing shirking 
(European Commission, 2014: 142). 
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In stark contrast to the elaborate and very complex EMCO indicators, stands a very simple 
and brief ‘Scoreboard of key employment and social indicators’, releasedby the European 
Commission around the same time(Andor, 2013). The scoreboard was composed of three 
employment indicators (unemployment rate, youth unemployment rate, and NEETs rate) 
and three social indicators (gross household disposable income, risk of poverty, and 
income inequality).The simplicity and brevity of the scoreboard certainly contributed to its 
attractiveness and resulted in it being widely used in the policy monitoring and 
assessment process at the EU level (European Commission, 2015c and 2017c). Moreover, 
the scoreboard omitted, admittedly along many key labour market and social indicators, 
any disputable or contentious items, including any aspect of job quality. While structural 
features of the labour market (such as the unemployment rate) are crucial to the 
environment in which job quality develops, they do not, however, evaluate the quality of 
job characteristics. In that respect, the scoreboard was certainly a missed opportunity to 
insert job quality indicators into the cycle of EU policy coordination. 
 
The Pillar of Social Rights and the Art of Compromise 
With some signs of labour market recovery and the installation of a new European 
Commission presided over by Jean-Claude Junker in 2014, social issues re-gained some 
ground in the EU policy debate. The turning pointin the narrative came with the 
proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) in November 2017. 
The Pillarwas aimed at creating convergence between Member States towards fair and 
good working and living conditions(see e.g. European Commission, 2017b). Itwas built 
around three areas of rights: equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair 
working conditions, and social protection and inclusion. It did not explicitly refer to job or 
employment quality in any of the 20 principles, but the area of fair working conditions 
overlaps to a great extent with aspects of job quality, by including contract types, wages, 
social dialogue, work-life balance, or health and safety at work (European Commission, 
2017f).  
The only direct reference to quality working conditions in the Pillar was in the context of 
promoting innovative forms of workand encouraging entrepreneurship and self-
employment. Thus, the Pillar very much replicatedthe commitment to flexibility and 
adopted some ofthe flexicurity language, by conditioning the provision of fair and secure 
working arrangements on ensuring “the necessary flexibility for employers to adapt swiftly 
to changes in the economic context” (European Commission, 2017f). It is only the abuse, 
not any use, of atypical contracts leading to precarious working conditions that should be 
prevented, according to the Pillar. It is very likely that regulations negotiated under such 
ambiguously formulated policy objectives will not effectively address the issues of job 
quality, but admittedly the Pillar paves the way for at least some regulation on some 
extreme features of poor-quality employment. 
The Pillar was accompanied by a new set of indicators, called the Social Scoreboard 
(European Commission, 2017a), which replaced the previous Scoreboard of key 
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employment and social indicators from 2013. The indicators were intended as a central 
tool for monitoring convergence towards better working and living conditions, and 
facilitating a stronger consideration of employment and societal challenges within the 
European Semester (European Commission, 2017a).  
The Social Scoreboard consisted of three broad dimensions that correspond to the three 
main categories of rights from the Pillar. Interestingly, the second dimensions, in the Pillar 
entitled ‘Fair working conditions’, was changedin the Scoreboard to ‘Dynamic labour 
markets and fair working conditions’. The three dimensions are further divided into twelve 
areas and measured with 42 indicators in total (web version) that assess employment and 
social trends. 
Uponcloser examination, many of the indicators in fact overlap with the previous 
scoreboard from 2013 and also replicate the focus on job quantity and structural features 
of the labour market, failingto include the quality of job characteristics. Even the 
dimension‘Dynamic labour markets and fair working conditions’ does not attempt to 
measure the quality of working conditions. On the Commission’s website, containing the 
full version of the Scoreboard
1
, this dimension includes labour force structure, with 
employment, unemployment and activity rates; labour market dynamics, with activation 
measures, tenure at current job and transitions from temporary to permanent 
employment; and income, with household income, risk of poverty and compensation of 
employees per hour worked. Thus, the latter variable—individual income from 
employment—is the only aspect of job quality included in the scoreboard. 
However, it should be noted that the measurement of income did not make it into the 
actual policy making process, as can be observed in the Joint Employment Report in 
2018(European Commission, 2018), the first of use the scoreboard in the European 
Semester. In the report, the Social Scoreboard is used selectively, with the dimension 
‘Dynamic labour markets and fair working conditions’ assessed only through the 
employment and unemployment rates and the gross disposable income of households.In 
practice then, the new Social Scoreboard looks a lot like the previous scoreboard from 
2013.From the perspective of measuring job quality, no effective progress can be 
observed. 
 
The Role of Job Quality Indicators in Translating Discourse into Actions 
In the previous section we reviewed some of the key policy strategies developed at the EU 
level in the area of work and employment. Such strategies constitute a reference 
framework for the monitoring and assessment of how Member States perform. In 
practical terms, they frame the narrative and provide key terms and indicators used in the 
cycle of EU economic and social governance coordination, currently synchronised into the 
European Semester, which involves setting priorities, evaluating performance and 
                                                          
1https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/social-scoreboard/ 
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outlining recommendations. This is where job quality indicators could potentially play 
arole. However, as we demonstrate in the following review of the evolution of 
socioeconomic governance in the EU, job quality has barely featured there. We argue that 
this is largely accounted for by weaknesses in the conceptualisation of job quality(which 
gives no clear indication of the direction for improvement), and a dominance of the 
commitment to flexibility in the policy discourse. Overall, the process described below 
closely resembles Kingdon’s theory of organised anarchy (1995) as multiple actors 
attempted to converge in the definition of the job quality problem. 
The ‘more and better jobs’ objective set in Lisbon, then reasserted duringthe following 
Council meetings in Nice and Stockholm, gave job quality a prominent place among 
priorities for common employment policy. The Employment Guidelines of 2002 (European 
Commission, 2002)thus repeated the calls for improving the quality of jobs, employment 
and work. The guidelines also specified the areas that should be addressed in order to 
achieve improvement in job quality and the list entirely overlapped with the Laeken 
proposal, including all 10 dimensions. This was certainly an important contribution of the 
Laeken framework, as it provided a working definition of job quality. However, its 
methodological weaknesses and a lack of agreement on indicators and data side-lined job 
quality in the formulation of concrete targets. Instead, the emphasis remained on full 
employment, flexible forms of work and lifelong learning, and the underlying assumption 
was that action in these areas will also bring improvements in job quality.  
By the launch of the Europe2020 strategy in 2010, job quality lost much of its momentum 
at the EU level. The focus was on restoring job growth and the activation of labour 
markets, with flexicurity principles cited as a necessary set of measures to achieve these 
goals. This is clearly visible in the Employment Guidelines from 2010 (European 
Commission, 2010b). Guideline 7was entitled ‘Increasing labour market participation of 
women and men, reducing structural unemployment and promotingjob quality[emphasis 
added]’. It stated that “*t+he quality of jobs and employment conditions should be 
addressed”, but without giving any details as to how this should be pursued, nor setting 
any targets or including indicators. The only concrete and measurable target included in 
the guideline was the employment rate.  
Such a way of including job quality in the guidelines greatly reduced its potential impact 
and failed to overcome the rhetorical level. As a result, job quality was being consistently 
left out from the annual evaluation of the implementation of the guidelines across EU 
Member States. A good illustration is found in the Joint Employment Reports (JER), which 
are a key input into EU economic governance and every year examine the Member States’ 
actions in implementing their employment policy in line with the employment guidelines. 
The sections dedicated to Guideline 7, which includes the promotion of job quality in 
itstitle, simply kept erasing that part of the title and accordingly failed to include any 
issues related to job quality in the evaluation. For instance, in JER 2014 the guideline was 
reduced to “Increasing labour market participation” (European Commission, 2013: 18), 
and in JER 2015 to “Increasing labour market participation and reducing structural 
unemployment” (European Commission, 2015c: 32). 
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The launch of EMCO’s job quality indicators made its mark on the following revision of the 
Employment Guidelines in 2015. Its influence resembled the impact of the Laeken 
proposal on the earlier guidelines. The positive contribution consisted of adding content 
to the label ‘quality employment’ by providing a list of dimensions that should be 
addressed by the Member States. Thus, in line with the EMCO proposal, the guidelines 
recommended that quality employment “should be ensured in terms of socio-economic 
security, education and training opportunities, working conditions (including health and 
safety) and work-life balance”(European Commission, 2015b). However, a lack of specific 
targets or measures to be applied with the aim of boosting employment quality meant 
that the earlier bias towards the quantity of jobswas reproduced. The perspective of 
employers dominated the formulation of policies based on these Guidelines. In particular, 
the evaluation of the extent to which countries follow the Guidelines on improving 
employment quality was limited to a very simplistic assessment of labour market 
segmentation, which included the share of temporary employment and transition rates 
from temporary to permanent jobs (European Commission, 2016: 52–56). Accordingly, 
policy responses across Member States that were positively evaluated by the European 
Commission included the relaxation of employment protection legislation to ease 
dismissals, which translates into less job security for workers and was found to have an 
adverse impact on job quality(McGovern et al., 2004; Piasna, 2018; Piasna and Myant, 
2017; Rubery et al., 2016). Attention given by the report to the quality of working time 
was also limited to policies that increase flexibility to allow for economic adjustments and 
improve cost-competitiveness (European Commission, 2016: 60–61). 
This links to yet another important impediment to how job quality impacts EU 
employment policy. The commitment of EU institutions to improving job quality was in 
fact rather superficial and inconsistent, often based on inserting theword ‘quality’ before 
‘job’, without attention to the context and the logical meaning of the message. This is not 
just a suspicion but can be verified when comparing proposals for the revised guidelines 
with the final adopted texts. Employment Guidelines from 2015 are a good illustration of 
this point. Guideline 5 states: 
“Member States should facilitate the creation of quality jobs, reduce the barriers 
business faces in hiring people, promote entrepreneurship and, in particular, 
support the creation and growth of small enterprises.” (European Commission, 
2015b, emphasis added) 
In this case, the word ‘quality’ was not present in the proposal (European Commission, 
2015a), and was only added at a later stage, although the rest of the sentence remained 
essentially the same. Overall, this results in incoherent recommendations of promoting 
job quality through de-regulation, liberalisation and more contractual diversity (European 
Commission, 2017d), which contradicts the vast body of research linking such policies with 
poor job quality and precariousness (see overview in Rubery and Piasna, 2016). 
The launch of the Pillar in 2017 with its objective of fair working conditions, raised the 
profile of the social dimension in the governance structure and gave the social side a 
stronger position in a subsequent revision of the employment guidelines. The wording of 
12 
 
the above cited guideline was again tweaked by changing “promote entrepreneurship” to 
“fostering responsible entrepreneurship and genuine self-employment” (Council of the 
European Union, 2018: 9). While this was an important change insofar as it acknowledged 
that self-employment is not necessarily a route to good quality employmentand may 
beprecarious, the meaning of‘responsible’ and ‘genuine’was left open to interpretation, 
thus risking a further dilution of this guideline in the evaluation process. 
Finally, the analysis of employment guidelines illustrates an important source of tension in 
the debate on job quality within the EU, which has significantly hindered its progress: the 
political struggle between pro-regulation and de-regulatory coalitions(Mailand and 
Arnholtz, 2015).Put differently, in terms of political priorities, the concept of job quality 
has had to rival for attention with the ‘flexicurity’ debate, which emerged within the EU 
during the mid-1990s, and had gained a firm foothold within DG Employment by 2008(for 
discussion see e.g. Klindt, 2011). 
Policy objectives formulated at the EU level emphasisethe need to ensure flexibility for 
employers, encourage new forms of work and flexible work arrangements. At most, only 
“extreme flexibility” (European Commission, 2017e: 116) is undesirable, yet there is no 
clear delineation of theboundary beyond which the “extreme” form begins. This 
commitment to flexibility, very much linked to flexicurity policy, distorts the processes of 
policy evaluation and recommendations in the area of job quality. It results in very weak 
and often contradictory guidelines on how to create quality jobs.  
Examples of such contradictions can be found in the Country Specific Recommendations 
(CSRs), issued by the EU to all countries to assess the implementation of Employment 
Guidelines and to put forward proposals for the European Semester. For instance, 
Lithuania in 2011 was advised to “enhance labour market flexibility by amending its labour 
legislation to make it more flexible and to allow a better use of fixed-term contracts” even 
though the latter are commonly regarded as indicative of poor job quality (e.g. Green and 
Mostafa, 2012; Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernández-Macías, Antón, et al., 2011). Similarly, 
Poland in 2015 was given the contradictory advice that permanent employment is 
burdensome, costly and not attractive for employers, but that a high proportion of non-
standard and weakly protected contracts may reduce the quality of available employment 
(European Commission and Council, 2015). We find similar inconsistencies with respect to 
wages, another important dimension of job quality. The CSRs for Bulgaria in 2015 and 
Latvia in 2016, for example, recommended wage moderation, as wage increases were 
considered to be distorting the labour markets and harming competitiveness. At the same 
time, both countries were warned about high levels of poverty. 
 
Discussion: political and methodological shortcomings 
 
This article has discussed how and why progress towards articulating job quality in the 
EU’s employment policyhas been slow,not only in terms of overarching principles but also 
concrete actions. It was hindered by conceptual confusion,a lack of a shared definition 
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and a disagreement on how to organiseamultitude of work dimensions into a coherent 
comparative framework of indicators. The combination of punctuated equilibriums 
(reference) and organised anarchy (Kingdon, 2012) have led to a failure to produce any 
open method of coordination (de la Porte and Pochet, 2012). As a result, no statistically 
relevant indicators that can help with the definition and monitoring of job quality have 
been agreed.  
This reflects the complexity of the whole issue of job quality. There are not only multiple 
facets of jobs that should be taken into account, but also multiple levels on which jobs can 
be analysed, ranging from thesubjective evaluation of a particular working environment to 
broad labour market systems in which jobs are performed.  
As discussed above, policy strategy needs to be converted into concrete aims or targets so 
that non-compliance can be sanctioned: this is the role for indicators. But as shown in the 
previous section, job quality indicators that follow from EU policy strategies appear 
ambiguous and ambivalent. Therefore, the actions devised on their basis do not add up to 
a coherent policy capable of effectively addressing issues of poor job quality. Moreover, 
our analysis confirmed what previous studies noted: a dominant position of economic 
surveillance, or market making social policies, which use the ambiguity and confusion in 
job quality indicators to their advantage and submit social policy to market efficiency 
goals. Little ideational impact of job quality indicators, actors use it in a way that coincides 
with their political agenda.   
Another important weakness of the EU’s institutional initiatives reviewed above is the lack 
of a coherent theoretical framework that would inform the selection of variables and 
guide their meaningful interpretation. The choice of variables tends to be driven by pre-
existing policy objectives and availability of data rather than by any explicit reference to 
social or economic theories. Many key dimensions of work quality were thus omitted, for 
political or practical rather than for conceptual reasons, while too many others were 
included in a way that precludes analytical impact(see discussion in Burchell et al., 2014; 
Sehnbruch et al., 2015). Thus, characteristics of labour supply were often mixed up with 
indicators of labour demand, and the distinction between dependent and independent 
variables became confused. The complexity, overly broad scope, lack of transparency and 
flexibility in accommodating many of the proposed thematic indicators are partly to blame 
for the limited impact of these initiatives, whether as an advocacy or policy tool(Hoffmann 
and Dooren, 2015; Ward, 2004). This not only hinders the formulation of concrete policy 
measures but may even generate conflicting recommendations, as demonstrated by the 
CSRs discussed above. 
Furthermore, the definition of job quality and the selection of facets of employment via 
which to measure it depend on the perspective adopted. A complex and multi-
dimensional concept such as job quality can be analysed from many, often rivalling, 
political or ideological perspectives. The meaning attributed to job quality will be different 
depending on whether it is viewed from the standpoint of individual workers, families, 
employers or from a societal perspective. 
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The difficulties faced by the EU institutions in their efforts to conceptualise and measure 
job quality, and build effective policy measures, thus stem from tensions between the 
different perspectives of the social partners: governments, employers and trade unions. 
While employers emphasise measures of productivity and flexibility, governments stress 
the sustainability of public finances, and unions prioritise job stability, good working 
conditions and collective bargaining (Freistein, 2016). This has led to a plethora of 
variables being included in job quality definitions to ensure that these different points of 
view are incorporated. In practice, however, the sheer number of variables makes these 
definitions impossible to operationalize. 
While the EU socioeconomic governance assumes the mutual reinforcement and effective 
balancing of economic, employment and social policy(Council of the European Union, 
2006: 23), in practice, this positive interaction has not always worked as intended (Zeitlin, 
2007). There was an uneven evolution of the influence and organisation of actors in the 
domains of finance and employment within EU institutions, which has produced an 
asymmetry between economic and social issues (Mailand and Arnholtz, 2015; Maricut and 
Puetter, 2018). The asymmetry in favour of the economic actors has been undoubtedly 
accentuated by the crisis of 2008, which brought about a significant slowdown for social 
Europe with a legislative breakdown in the social domain (Degryse and Pochet, 2018). 
In consequence, the EU policy put emphasis on enhancing competitiveness and improving 
the employment intensity of economic growth, among others, by increasing labour 
market flexibility. Most of the policy documents produced at the EU level, contain either 
direct calls for more flexibility and less regulatory burdens for employers (e.g. European 
Commission, 2010a), or propose social policy measures with the reservation that they 
should neither constrain employers nor obstruct the development of new (i.e. atypical, 
flexible and in most cases casual) forms of work (e.g. European Commission, 2017d). Even 
the recently launched European Pillar of Social Rights is built around the vision of 
balancing rights for workers with flexibility for employers, subjecting the former to the 
latter. Thus, overall, despite the existence of legal grounds for the EU institutions to 
address the quality of working conditions, the policy agenda tends to be dominated by a 
commitment to regulatory flexibility. 
These complex problems generate a highly problematic vicious circle: to inform political 
debates appropriately, evidence is needed on the respective outcomes of policies that 
promote job quality. Yet without a precise conceptualisation and definition of what is 
meant by ‘job quality’, we cannot inform this debate. Furthermore, without such a 
definition, the EU cannot propose specific guidelines for a more integrated employment 
policy that takes job quality into account and accords the issue the importance we think it 
deserves. 
 
Conclusions 
This article analysed the standing of job quality in the current EU employment policy. We 
considered reasons for the lack of effective progress observed thus far in the development 
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of job quality indicators capable of guiding European social and employment policies. The 
analysis also considered the impact of power imbalances between social actors and the 
role of dominant narrative on the use of available indicators in the policy making process. 
Several important impediments emerge from the analysis, hampering the development of 
policy-oriented framework for the comparative measurement of job quality at the EU 
level. The articulation of job quality at the policy level is undoubtedly linked to the 
methodological, conceptual and theoretical confusion about what job quality actually is 
and from whose perspective it should be considered. Many labour market variables are 
contentious and their interpretation in terms of job quality depends on from whose 
perspective they are evaluated. Whilst higher wages may be better for workers, 
employers would argue that they harm their cost competitiveness. Employer-led forms of 
work flexibility might represent unpredictability and insecurity for workers, and so on. The 
interests of workers, employers and public policy makers often clash, as do the interests 
of individual human beings and free markets.  
As a result, it is difficult to reach universal agreement on what constitutes a good job. This 
poses particular difficulties for international bodies, where any progress is based on a 
compromise between the interests of employers, policy makers or employees. This is one 
of the main reasons institutional initiatives within the EU to build a universally applicable 
methodology for the measurement of job quality have so far been unsuccessful. This 
conceptual confusion withvested political interests are real but not insurmountable. 
We argue that to integrate job quality analysis better into a coherentsocial policy 
framework, it is necessary to define and consider carefully what the relevant dimensions 
of job quality are, on which level the analysis should focus, and from whose perspective. 
These choices should then beappliedconsistently in the formulation of Employment 
Guidelines and their monitoring across countries(see also Piasna et al., 2017).In addition, 
successful indicators which have a significant impact on policy makers must not be too 
complex, both in terms of their methodology and the quantity of variables included 
(Ward, 2004).  
Moreover, increasing profile of social issues on the policy agenda and balancing the input 
from different sides of the social partners’ negotiating table are essential to 
counterbalancing the dominance of economic surveillance in the European Semester. as a 
result, the efforts to increase the importance of better working and living conditions in the 
EU policy together with the launch of the European Pillar of Social Rights are a much 
anticipated and welcomed step in this direction. However, the precedence given to 
flexibility and the persistence of the logic of flexicurity requirethat a more radical change 
is,of course,still needed before job quality becomes a concrete and measurable target in 
the EU’s employment policy. 
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